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In a recent paper, Frankel and Rose (1998) documented endoge-
nous e¤ects of a monetary union, whereby costs and bene…ts of the
union evolve after its implementation. This paper questions their …nd-
ings on three grounds. First, their main result that trading partners
display relatively more synchronized cycles is not robust to the pres-
ence of …xed e¤ects, or variables omitted from their estimation liable
to generate both intense trade and synchronized cycles. Second, the
cost of giving up independent monetary policy is usually evaluated on
the basis of the extent of co-‡uctuations between business cycles. We
bring into focus which measure of the cycle ought to be used for that
purpose. In particular, such measure should in our opinion re‡ect how
synchronized cycles would be in the absence of independent monetary
policy. Third, documenting the assumption that …xed exchange rate
regimes translate into more bilateral trade has proved elusive. We show
that using a bilateral rather than cross-country approach brings little
improvement on that front.
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11 Introduction
The bene…ts of a monetary union are usually associated with the intensity of
trade between prospective members, and its costs originate in the inability to
counteract asymmetric ‡uctuations through independent monetary policy1.
This paper argues that both business cycles synchronization and trade inten-
sity react endogenously to the implementation of a currency union, and thus
that the costs and bene…ts of the union evolve after it is decided. Frankel
and Rose (1998) - FR henceforth- showed empirically that trade partners
display more conformity in their cycles and inferred that a monetary union
should have ex-post e¤ects likely to diminish endogenously the very cost of
its implementation. The paper criticizes this claim on three grounds: …rst,
the Frankel and Rose result is not robust to the inclusion of country-pair
speci…c …xed e¤ects. Second, insofar as they embed the …netuning e¤ects
of -partly- independent monetary policies, international correlations of out-
put or employment provide poor measures of how asymmetric ‡uctuations
would be in the absence of monetary policy. Third, even if trade fosters
cycle synchronization, it remains to be seen whether a currency union will
stimulate exchanges, a frequent assumption with scant empirical support at
best. The method proposed here generates some evidence - though weak-
that countries agreeing on a …xed exchange rate regime trade signi…cantly
more with each other.
To a large extent, theory of the international business cycle has focused
on the so-called quantity puzzle, as coined by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland
(1994), whereby outputs are negatively correlated as resources travel where
the rates of return are highest. This has given rise to a variety of sophisti-
cated attempts to correct this defect, involving for instance nominal rigidi-
ties, multi-sectoral models or shocks at the international level2. However,
none of these improvements can explicitly help predict cross-sectional varia-
tion in the extent of cycle synchronization3. Thus, the empirical researcher
must remain agnostic as to what variables ought to be included when at-
tempting to explain why two countries co-‡uctuate relatively more. Figure 1
1The cost of losing monetary independence can be mitigated if labor is su¢ciently
mobile between the member countries, or if an international system of …scal transfers
exists. These aspects are assumed away in the paper.
2See for instance Kollmann (1998), Hornstein and Praschnick (1997) or Canova (1993).
3In our opinion, this is an important and unexplored area of research in the inter-
national business cycle literature. See Imbs (1998) for a more thorough analysis of why
countries co-‡uctuate.
2reproduces the main result in FR, namely that trade partners display more
synchronized cycles: the relation is indeed positive, with a correlation coe¢-
cient equal to 0.21. However, there is no theoretical reason to limit oneself to
trade in explaining GDP correlations. For instance, geographical, historical
or institutional factors could play a signi…cant role, thus casting doubt on
the claim in Frankel and Rose. For instance in a context of multiple equilib-
ria, the use of a common language, or access to common media could play a
coordinating role in selecting an equilibrium. This is illustrated in Figure 2,
that plots GDP correlations against bilateral distance: the correlation does
appear negative, at -0.20. The well-known fact that trade partners are often
close to each other is reproduced in Figure 3: thus, the apparent relation
between trade and cycle synchronization may actually be spurious insofar as
it may stem from the fact that geographically close countries tend to both
trade with each other and display synchronized business cycles. In fact, Imbs
(1998b) shows that bilateral trade is actually a surprisingly poor predictor
of co-‡uctuations. The paper elaborates on the …xed-e¤ect argument that
underpins this criticism.
If one wants to evaluate the cost of giving up independent monetary pol-
icy, one must estimate the degree of conformity between cycles abstracting
from the e¤ects of monetary policy -a measure of “structural synchronization”-
a task best ful…lled using bilateral correlations of Total Factor Productivity
(TFP), or, under some additional assumptions, correlations between labor
productivity. Indeed, output or employment correlations surely contain the
e¤ects of a policy that the purpose of the exercise is to assume away. TFP
correlations, on the other hand, are supposedly purged from the e¤ects of
monetary policy, and potentially from those of …scal policy as well. Thus,
TFP correlations provide a conservative estimate of the costs of a monetary
union, in that they tend to over-estimate them, whereas output correlations
under-estimate them4. If trade is to alleviate some of the cost of giving up
independent monetary policy, it ought to matter positively for TFP cor-
relations -which would happen for instance if technology were transmitted
through trade. It is of course often argued that TFP as measured by the
Solow Residual is nothing but a noisy measure of output, thus casting doubt
on the meaning of bilateral correlations of TFP. Figure 4 plots TFP corre-
lations against bilateral trade, and the unconditional correlation is actually
positive though less signi…cant that in the output case, at 0.15. Furthermore,
4Imbs (1998a) shows the importance of choosing the right measure: while European
outputs have become more synchronized betwen 1970 and 1993, European TFPs have on
the contrary become more idiosyncratic.
3it is customary to assume the e¤ects of monetary policy to be short-lived,
and thus to be for the most part captured by ‡uctuations in the labor input.
Accordingly, we supplement the previous evidence by computing bilateral
correlations between labor productivities, and argue that they provide an es-
timate of “structural synchronization”, less questionable than TFP in that it
does not fall victim to the issue of measurement of the capital input. Figure
5 plots labor productivity against bilateral trade, with a positive correlation
equal to 0.10. The paper presents multi-variate estimations meant to check
those unconditional correlations for robustness.
No consensus has emerged from the many papers seeking to establish
both theoretically and empirically the e¤ects of the exchange rate regime
on trade. Nevertheless, the assumption that …xing the exchange rate stimu-
lates international exchanges is made in a host of papers -starting with FR-
and many economists still view a stable currency as favorable to trade. A
set of recent papers has argued theoretically that the level of trade is not
necessarily higher under …xed exchange rate regimes. For instance, Ricci
(1998) presents a model where a ‡oating exchange rate acts as an insurance
mechanism. The e¤ects of domestic demand shocks are mitigated by move-
ments in the exchange rate, and risk-averse …rms will trade more in a regime
of ‡oat. Bacchetta and vanWincoop (1998) develop a general equilibrium
model with monopolistic competition, where the relationship between trade
and exchange rate regime depends on the form of the utility function, cal-
ibration of risk aversion as well as the nature of stochastic developments.
Gagnon (1993) constructs a model meant to exaggerate the negative e¤ect of
exchange rate variability, for which he provides a statistically insigni…cant -
yet economically signi…cant- upper bound. Unfortunately, perhaps precisely
because the e¤ects are statistically insigni…cant, empirical analyses of the
issue have so far been unable to settle the debate, for most of them provide
at best weak evidence in one way or the other5. There is to our knowl-
edge no paper that attempts to measure the e¤ect of bilateral regime on the
intensity of bilateral trade, rather resorting to more classical cross-country
arguments. This paper proposes to …ll that gap, unfortunately to no decisive
avail.
Ex-post e¤ects of a currency union are therefore ambiguous. Suppos-
ing that it may stimulate trade, a currency union becomes endogenously
more desirable. On the other hand however, perhaps precisely because it
5See for instance the survey by Cote (1994).
4stimulates exchanges and thus fosters international specialization, a cur-
rency union makes it possible for aggregate shocks to become more country-
speci…c, and thus makes it dearer to forego independent monetary policy.
While this paper shows that aggregate data cannot be used to refute the
latter e¤ect, a detailed analysis using sectoral data ought to quantify its
importance.
Aside from the already cited paper by Frankel and Rose (1998), evi-
dence on ex-post e¤ects of a currency union is limited. Canova and Dellas
(1993) showed that the signi…cance of trade in the transmission of economic
disturbances across countries is not robust to the choice of the detrending
method, and thus did already cast doubt on the Frankel and Rose result.
The present paper goes however further, …rst by showing that the signif-
icance of trade is not robust even when one sticks to a single detrending
method, and by addressing the question of the e¤ect of trade on structural
correlations. Artis and Zhang (1995) show that business cycles in European
countries have become more similar to the German cycle than to the US’s
since the inception of the European Monetary System, and thus argue that
successful …xed exchange rate regimes lead to conformity in the business
cycles of the participating countries. The present paper reproduces their
result, but shows that it is not general.
The paper is organized as follows: next section describes the empirical
method used, as well as the way standard econometric issues in this literature
are confronted. Section 3 presents the results, arguing in particular for
the importance of …xed e¤ects in the FR …ndings. Section 4 develops our
evidence on the e¤ects of trade on “structural” synchronization of cycles,




The strategy is similar to FR. Measures ½ of cycle synchronization are ob-
tained by computing output bilateral correlations for 21 OECD countries6,
which generates 210 observations. The sample period 1970:1 - 1993:4 is di-
vided into sub-periods ¿ = 3;4, which multiplies further the number of ob-
servations and gives a panel structure to the dataset. These are computed
using the same data as in FR. Moreover, a measure of the “structural” ex-
tent of co-‡uctuations requires the construction of Solow Residuals for the
21 countries in the sample. The necessary series on quarterly national ag-
gregates comes either from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics or
from the OECD’s Quarterly National Accounts7
Data on bilateral trade intensity come from the IMF’s Direction of Trade
dataset. As in FR, annual data from 1970 to 1993 is used to compute an
indicator of bilateral trade intensity, WT:
WTi;j;¿ = (Xi;j;¿ +Mi;j;¿)=(Xi;¿ + Xj;¿ + Mi;¿ + Mj;¿)
where Xi;j;¿ denotes total nominal exports from country i to country j cu-
mulated over period ¿, Xi;¿ denotes total global exports from country i over
period ¿, and M denotes imports. As in FR, the argument is that higher
values of, say, wti;j;¿ are indicative of greater trade intensity between coun-
tries i and j. There is a trade-o¤ in choosing ¿: the number of observations
increases with the number of periods, but the accuracy of the estimated cor-
relations diminishes with it. We choose to run our estimations for ¿ = 3;4
and periods of equal length8.
6Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the UK and the US.
7Output is assumed to be derived from a Cobb-Douglas production function taking
capital and labor stocks as inputs. We assume constant returns to scale, and thus take
aggregate payments to labor averaged over time as the empirical counterpart to the labor
elasticity of output. Capital series are constructed using the permanent inventory method.
8This is clearly arbitrary. However, insofar as the paper brings focus on the impor-
tance of e¤ects that remain constant over time, the choice of sub-periods is probably not
substantial to the conclusion.
62.2 Econometric Issues
Consider the equation to estimate
½¿ = ®0 + ®1WT¿ + ®2X¿ + "¿ (1)
where ½¿ denotes GDP correlations over ¿ and X¿ contains other variables
whose e¤ect ought to be controlled for. The absence of indices i or j re-
‡ects the fact that all pairs of countries are stacked and included in the
estimation. While it is not clear on what ground, FR seem to pay particular
attention to the issue of reverse causality in (1), arguing that “countries are
likely to link their currencies deliberately to those of their most important
trading partners” and “exchange rate stability could cause both high trade
and co-ordinated business cycles”. In our opinion, the issue is more one
of omitted variable, as this paper more generally contends -hence the im-
portance of what variables are included in X¿. Furthermore, seminal work
on international business cycles predicts that countries with synchronized
cycles would if anything trade relatively less9, thus making it di¢cult to see
how a positive ®1 could stem from reverse causality. However, for the sake of
comparison we shall attempt to correct for this hypothetical bias. FR do it
by making use of the now well-documented fact that geography is a powerful
determinant of bilateral trade10, a common justi…cation to use geographic
considerations, as summarized by the so-called gravity variables, as instru-
ments for trade in two-stage least-square regressions11. Unfortunately, as we
argued earlier and elsewhere12 there are no a priori reasons why geography
can be excluded from the right-hand side of (1), thus making it di¢cult
to resort to the same instruments as when investigating the growth e¤ects
of trade. In particular, we know already from Figure 2 that the distance
variable belongs in X¿, and thus cannot be used as an instrument for trade,
as FR do. Omitting the distance variable -or others, for that matter- from
X¿ is at the core of our criticism of FR.
We attempt to correct for the putative reverse causality bias in two ways.
First, as it turns out, some gravity variables can actually be excluded from
the right-hand side of (1). We use them as instruments. Second, we take
9This is for instance the case in Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1995).
10See for instance Deardor¤ (1984), Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995) or Frankel (1996).
11See for instance Frankel and Romer (1996). There, they argue that at least some com-
ponents of trade corresponding to geographic considerations are unlikely to be correlated
with the left-hand side variable, in their case output growth.
12See Imbs (1998b).
7advantage of the panel structure of the data and use lagged values of the
right–hand side variables, at least six years older when ¿ = 4. We therefore
estimate:
½¿ = ®0 + ®1WT¿¡1 + ®2X¿¡1 + "¿ (1’)
Next section shows that correcting for endogeneity bias modi…es very little
the estimates of ®1.
More importantly, omitting the distance variable from X¿ generates a
potentially important omitted variable bias, whereby positive estimates of
®1 are spuriously high. One can indeed think of a wide range of variables po-
tentially associated with synchonized business cycles, that could also cause
intense bilateral trade. Examples include geographical, institutional or his-
torical considerations, such as proximity, the presence of a mountain range, a
history of war or membership to international agreements. In Imbs (1998b)
we take that issue seriously, and investigate in detail what causes cross-
sectional variation in GDP correlations. Su¢ce it to say for the present
purpose that X¿ potentially contains a large number of variables, whose
omission is liable to make ®1 very positive. A rough way to correct for
this bias is to assume X¿ = X, i.e. omitted variables remain constant over
time13. Under that -fairly undemanding- assumption, omitted variable bias
can be accounted for using a …xed-e¤ect estimation, where …xed e¤ects are
speci…c to each country-pair. In other words, estimate
½¿ ¡ ½¿¡1 = ®1 (WT¿¡1 ¡WT¿¡2) + ´¿ (1”)
where the …rst-di¤erences on the right-hand side are lagged, so as to still
account for potential reverse causality bias. None of the FR results resist to
estimation of (1”). We proceed with a detailed discussion of the results.
3 Accounting for Fixed E¤ects
The body of the text presents results using GDP correlations, split into
three sub-periods. In section 4, we con…rm our …ndings carry through using
bilateral correlations of employment and industrial production instead, and
13In the absence of a proper theory directing the choice of variables, the more subtle
alternative to include all the relevant variables on the right-hand side and check whether









































































10ably short-lived, they are likely to be re‡ected by movements in the labor
input, and thus …ltered from labor productivity. On the other hand, labor
productivity ‡uctuates with cyclical movements in the capital stock, which
presumably correspond to developments of a non-monetary nature. It may
therefore provide a reasonably good account of how cycles would look in
the absence of monetary policy. As before however, the impact of trade
disappears when other factors are accounted for.
4.2 E¤ects of the Exchange Rate Regime
Providing decisive evidence about the e¤ects of the exchange rate regime
on trade is one of the most elusive endeavor in empirical international eco-
nomics. The method here provides however a potentially fruitful approach,
as it focuses on bilateral variables rather than mere cross-country evidence.
Thus we want to estimate
WT¿ = ¯0 + ¯1 ½¿ + ¯2 ER¿ + ¯3X¿ + "¿ (2)
There is undoubtedly a serious issue of endogeneity for the right-hand side
variables in (2). Given the evidence in this paper, ¯1 probably su¤ers less
from it than ¯2; as FR themselves argue, there is every reason to believe
that it is mostly between trade partners that …xed exchange rate regimes are
agreed on, thus resulting in a high value for ¯2 but with causality going the
reverse way. Finding legitimate instruments is however di¢cult because of
the presence of a trade variable on the left-hand side of (2), thus forbidding
the use of any so-called gravity variable, that will belong in X¿. As before
the issue is bypassed by using lagged values of the right-hand side variables.
In particular, serial correlation in the exchange rate regime variable is reas-
suringly low, as apparent from Figure 10. Given the substantial di¤erences
between ER¿ and ER¿¡1, it can be argued on reasonably safe grounds that
causality does not go from WT¿ to ER¿¡1. Table 4 presents estimates for
(2) both with contemporaneous and lagged values of the independent vari-
ables. Regressions (i) and (ii) show a signi…cant e¤ect of the exchange rate
regime, even after controlling for geographic variables. Regressions (iii) and
(iv) con…rm the …nding with lagged values of ½¿ and ER¿, though with sub-
stantially smaller point estimates. We interpret this as evidence that ¯2 is
indeed plagued by a reverse causality bias in (2), but the e¤ect of exchange
rate arrangements on trade still prevails after accounting for it.
11However, estimates in speci…cations (iii) and (iv) potentially fall victim
to the same …xed e¤ect criticism developed in the previous section. In par-
ticular, some variables omitted from X¿ could a¤ect simultaneously WT¿,
½¿ and ER¿. This would for instance be the case if geographic, historical or
political considerations, say, have an impact on exchange rate arrangements
as well as on WT¿ and ½¿ as argued previously18. Speci…cation (v) runs (2)
in …rst di¤erences for all observations available on WT¿, ½¿ and ER¿. No
coe¢cient comes out signi…cantly, but as argued earlier, …xed e¤ects esti-
mations tend to exaggerate measurement error. Speci…cation (vi) therefore
limits the sample to pairs of countries for which ½¿ is signi…cant at the 10%
level at least. Quite strikingly, for these pairs the exchange rate regime has
a signi…cant and positive e¤ect on trade. This is an interesting result in at
least two ways: …rst it provides some evidence in favor of real e¤ect of the
monetary regime, second and more importantly, it confers more credibility
to the other regressions estimated in …rst di¤erences in this paper: even
though WT¿ is very persistent, it remains meaningful even in growth rates.
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we check that the previous results are robust along two
margins: …rst we split the sample in four instead of three sub-periods. Sec-
ond, we use di¤erent measures of the cycle, namely industrial production
and employment. In Table 5, regressions (i) and (ii) show that the …xed
e¤ects argument carries through: if more trade results apparently in more
synchronized cycles, it is mostly due to omitted time invariant variables. Re-
gressions (iii) and (iv) con…rm that trade has no e¤ect on “structural” cycle
synchronization, as measured by TFP correlations. Finally, speci…cations
(v) and (vi) cast doubt on the robustness of the …nding developed in the
last section, that monetary arrangements have real e¤ects on trade. In par-
ticular, even for a subsample of signi…cant GDP correlations, the exchange
rate regime does not impact the level of bilateral trade. Finally, Table 6
reproduces …xed e¤ects estimations with bilateral correlations of indutrial
production and employment on the left-hand side. Bilateral trade never
plays a signi…cant role.
18Thus, it is for instance striking that Switzerland should remain outside of EMU, when
every single one of its neighbors committed to it. Political considerations of neutrality, to
a …rst approximation constant over time, probably play a role in explaining why.
125 Conclusion
There are three reasons why the claim that bilateral trade results in syn-
chronized business cycles ought to be quali…ed. First, both variables may
very well respond simultaneously to other factors, potentially time invari-
ant because of a geographic or institutional nature, but omitted from the
estimations underlying the argument. Second, is it really the extent of syn-
chronization as would prevail in the absence of independent monetary policy
that reacts to bilateral trade? If not, it is di¢cult to interpret this evidence
in the context of a monetary union. Finally, despite the omnipresence of
the hypothesis, it is far from clear that a …xed exchange rate regime will
stimulate exchanges. In this paper, we provide evidence that these three
quali…cations should be taken seriously. From the perspective of ex-posts
e¤ects of a currency union, the picture that emerges is mixed: while a …xed
regime might indeed result in more trade, and thus increase the desirability
of a single currency, the intensity of bilateral trade, in turn, will not impact
in any way the extent of cycle synchronization. From the perspective of
empirical international economics, the fact that time invariant factors may
explain an important part of the cross-sectional variation in GDP correla-
tions calls for a detailed study of the determinants of co-‡uctuations.
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Exchange Rate Regime 78.4-86.2Table 1: OLS and Reverse Causality Bias

































N Obs 628 628 628 628 418
R-Square 0.047 0.078 0.099 0.054 0.092
Dependent variable is GDP correlation. Huber-White t-statistics reported between brackets.
Distance is the kilometric distance between main cities, Adjacency takes value one if countries
have a common border, and Language takes value one if countries share the same language. (iv)
runs IV using adjacency and language as instruments. (v) runs the estimation using “lagged”
values of the RHS variables.Table 2: Fixed Effects Estimations
(i) (ii)




N Obs 208 28
R-Square 0.003 0.010
Dependent variable is growth in GDP correlations, between 78.4-86.2 and 86.3-93.4. Regression
(i) uses the log of bilateral trade growth between 70.1-78.3 and 78.4-86.2. Regression (ii) uses
only GDP correlations significant at the 10% level in all three sub-periods.Table 3: Structural Effects of Trade
Total Factor Productivity Labor Productivity











































N Obs 408 408 408 272 627 627
R-Square 0.029 0.031 0.038 0.053 0.010 0.035Table 4: Effects of the Exchange Rate Regime
OLS Lagged RHS First Differences




















































N Obs 570 570 361 361 152 24
R-Square 0.118 0.409 0.113 0.406 0.001 0.27
Dependent variable is bilateral trade. Regression (vi) is estimated using the sub-sample of GDP
correlations significant at the 10% level.Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis – 4 periods
GDP – First
Differences
Lagged TFP Trade – First
Differences


































N Obs 418 38 408 408 342 38
R-Square 0.000 0.017 0.028 0.036 0.001 0.029
Specifications (i) and (ii) check that effects of trade on GDP correlations do not resist fixed effect
estimation, even when only significant GDP correlations are included, as in (ii). Specifications
(iii) and (iv) check that trade has no effect on correlations of TFP. Specifications (v) and (vi)
check the effects of ER regime on trade in first differences.Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis – Alternative Measures of the Cycle
Industrial Production Employment


















































N Obs 627 418 209 627 418 209
R-Square 0.106 0.113 0.012 0.047 0.094 0.002